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In the summer of 2019, New Jersey became the eighth jurisdiction to pass legislation 
authorizing qualified, terminally ill patients to self-administer prescribed lethal medication.1 The 
Garden State began its efforts in 2014 when Governor Chris Christie pledged to veto any bill 
legalizing aid in dying. 2 New Jersey finally found success when Governor Phil Murphy signed the 
Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act (the “Act”). Maine followed shortly thereafter, 
increasing the total to nine jurisdictions that have aid in dying legislation.3 
Since the enactment of New Jersey’s Act, a New Jersey Department of Health report shows 
that twelve terminally ill patients utilized the legislation in 2019.4 Seven of those individuals were 
diagnosed with some type of terminal cancer and three suffered from a neuro-degenerative 
disease.5 One patient suffered from a pulmonary disease, and the other had a gastrointestinal 
disorder.6 These patients had to satisfy a number of stringent requirements in order to eventually 
self-administer the medication. While New Jersey and the other jurisdictions are in the minority in 
the country for those that allow medical aid in dying (“MAID”), these jurisdictions do not make it 
easy for patients to utilize the procedure. 
Because MAID is such a contentious matter, the statutes that authorize such practice are 
carefully drafted and filled with safeguards. The legislation is based on patient autonomy and self-
 
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-1 (2019) 
2 Niraj Chokshi, Christie may face a decision on assisted suicide in New Jersey (November 19, 2014) THE 
WASHINGTON POST https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/11/19/christie-may-face-a-decision-
on-assisted-suicide-in-new-jersey/.  
3 MAINE REV. STAT. 22 § 2140 (2019).  
4 The Office of the Chief State Medical Examiner, New Jersey Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act 2019 
Data Summary https://www.state.nj.us/health/advancedirective/documents/maid/2019_MAID_DataSummary.pdf 
5 Supra. 
6 Supra, note 4.  
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determination, as well as a purpose to minimize undignified and painful deaths.7 The states have a 
compelling interest in strictly regulating MAID in order to protect and preserve human life and the 
public welfare. Each state has regulated the process slightly differently but with the same goal of 
giving terminally ill patients the option to end their lives peacefully while also assuring safety. The 
statutes are all similar in nearly every provision, yet the seemingly minor differences spark interest 
and could even strike an intense debate. All things considered, the differences in provisions from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction may not yield drastically different results, but if the legislatures aim to 
maximize safety and minimize any wrongdoing, there are certain provisions that should be 
prioritized. 
 This paper will first describe the basics and background of MAID by outlining the main 
provisions included in each statute and the judicial history of aid in dying. This paper will then 
discuss the most recent litigation challenging MAID statutes. Next, this paper will provide a more 
in-depth analysis of the common provisions of all state statutes, pointing out the more critical 
portions. Last, this paper will recommend elements that should be included in every state statute 
in order to guarantee safety and to limit the risk of invalidation through litigation. Those 
recommendations include accounting for a patient’s mental illness, such as depression. This paper 
also recommends that all healthcare providers should be entitled to prohibit participation in the 
MAID process, as well as a requirement that healthcare providers who opt-out of the process must 
provide the patient with a source of information on MAID and transfer the relevant medical records 
to a willing healthcare provider.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Basics of Medical Aid in Dying Statutes  
 
7 Amanda M. Thyden, Death with Dignity and Assistance: A Critique of the Self-Administration Requirement in 
California’s End of Life Option Act, 20 Chap. L. Rev. 421, 423 (2017). 
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 The terminology for this phenomenon varies. A few terms that are widely used include 
“physician assisted suicide,” “mercy killing,” or “death with dignity.” This paper will refer to the 
practice of prescribing life-ending medication to a qualified, terminally ill patient as “medical aid 
in dying” or “MAID,” as this is the title of many state statutes, including New Jersey’s Act. 
 Terminally ill patients seek MAID as an option to relieve suffering. For those who suffer 
from diseases or conditions that take away independence and any enjoyment of life from the 
patient, MAID offers an opportunity to relieve the pain and die with comfort and dignity. Examples 
of illnesses that drive patients to utilize this process include various forms of cancer, neurological 
diseases, gastrointestinal diseases and other terminal diagnoses. MAID statutes provide a clear 
exception to the criminal prohibitions on assisted suicide that exist nationwide.8  
 Eight states in the country, plus the District of Columbia, established processes for 
terminally ill, qualified patients to seek a prescription for lethal medication to self-administer. In 
addition to these nine jurisdictions, Montana authorized MAID through a judicial decision.9 The 
Montana Supreme Court established that “a physician who aids a terminally ill patient in dying is 
not directly involved in the final decision or the final act.”10 The majority of the country still 
prohibits any form of assisted suicide, however, it could certainly be argued that the number of 
jurisdictions that make the effort to carefully permit MAID through detailed legislation will 
continue to grow. 
B. The Constitutional Backdrop 
There are multiple issues that surround this phenomenon, mostly constitutional. First, 
courts were faced with the question of whether a right to terminate medical treatment exists. This 
 
8 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal History of Medical Aid in Dying: Physician Assisted Death in U.S. Courts and 
Legislatures, 48 N.M.L. Rev. 267, 272 (2018). 
9 Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).   
10 Id. 1214. 
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topic was popularized by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health11 and Schiavo ex rel. 
Schindler v. Schiavo12, two cases that involved the right to refuse medical treatment and a standard 
of proof required for incompetent patients. In 1990, Chief Justice Rehnquist defined the right 
narrowly rather than establishing a right to die.13 After balancing state interests, the Cruzan Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not forbid Missouri’s 
procedural requirements of clear and convincing evidence to prove that a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state would want to terminate treatment.14 The Schiavo court affirmed a lower court’s 
decision that withholding nutrition and hydration from an incapacitated person based on the clear 
and convincing evidence standard was not unconstitutional.15 
 The issues developed when states took action to expressly prohibit assisted suicide. Courts 
no longer dealt with the right to terminate medical treatment and focused on whether there is a 
right to “pull the plug.” In Washington v. Glucksberg, physicians who assisted terminally ill 
patients and other gravely ill patients challenged a Washington state statute that prohibited assisted 
suicide.16 The state also permitted the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a 
patient’s direction. The legal issue was whether there is a fundamental right for competent people 
to seek physician assisted suicide.17 The Court held that this right is not fundamental as assisted 
suicide is not historically or traditionally recognized.18 The state has a legitimate interest in 
protecting and preserving life, protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession as well 
 
11 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  
12 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). 
13 Cruzan, at 269. 
14 Id. at 288. 
15 Schiavo, at 1296. 
16 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 706 (1997). 
17 Id. at 724.  
18 Id. 
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as protecting vulnerable groups of people.19 The ban on assisted suicide was found as rationally 
related to these legitimate state interests.20 
 In the same year, the Court considered whether a New York state law banning physician 
assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating all competent persons in the final 
stages of a fatal illness differently.21 In Vacco, causation and intent were the basis of the distinction 
between the act of terminating life-sustaining treatment compared to the act of providing treatment 
that will end one’s life.22 When a patient refuses a life-sustaining treatment, death is caused by the 
underlying fatal disease.23 Conversely, when a patient consumes a lethal medication administered 
by a physician, death is caused by that medication.24 The Court recognized a distinction between 
letting a patient die and more directly causing that patient’s death.25 For these reasons and because 
of the state’s legitimate interests, the New York state statute did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.26 
 Throughout these cases, it is important to note the way the Court frames the right, whether 
it is broad or narrow. As it stands today, there is no right to physician assisted suicide but there is 
a right to refuse life sustaining nutrition or medication. Also significant is the distinction 
established in Vacco between those who are terminally ill and request a drug to assist their death 
and those who withdrawal life support systems. The nine individual jurisdictions use these cases 
as a basis to create legislation that is constitutional. The legislatures must be careful not to frame 
the statutes as permitting the promotion or assistance of suicide because a fundamental right in 
 
19 Id. at 731. 
20 Id. at 733. 
21 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997). 




26 Id. at 808. 
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assisted suicide is not recognized. States have more creatively drafted legislation allowing doctors 
to prescribe lethal medication only if certain requirements are met and the medication is self-
administered by the patient, avoiding any form of euthanasia, voluntary or involuntary.  
C. Common Provisions of State MAID Statutes  
 Oregon was the first state to authorize MAID in 1995 and has drafted such a thorough 
statute that it serves as a model for the eight jurisdictions that followed.27 Oregon’s statute was 
amended in 1999 to expand and clarify particular provisions, and again in 2017.28 Some critics 
argue that the Oregon statute and the others that nearly duplicate it are so riddled with safeguards 
that it makes it virtually impossible to actually use the statute.29 However, the legislatures are 
obligated to account for every potential danger in this process and address methods to avoid those 
dangers in the statute. With a matter as significant as ending one’s life, safeguards should be 
welcomed.  
 The main safeguards that are included in every state statute include patient qualifications, 
voluntariness, patient capacity or competence, informed decision-making, second medical 
opinions, witnesses, written and oral requests as well as waiting periods.30 The other eight statutes 
certainly piggy-back off of Oregon’s legislation to some extent.31 Within each of these main 
provisions lies some minor differences from state-to-state that should be accounted for.  
i. Patient Qualifications 
 
27 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800 (2017). 
28 Id; Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal History of Medical Aid in Dying: Physician Assisted Death in U.S. Courts and 
Legislatures, 48 N.M.L. Rev. 267, 278 (2018) (also noting the express authorization of physicians to dispense lethal 
medications, relieving the responsibility from pharmacists who wish to refrain). 
29 Id. at 276. 
30 Carol A. Pratt, Efforts to Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide in New York, Washington and Oregon: Contrast 
Between Judicial and Initiative Approaches – Who Should Decide?, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1027 (1998). 
31 Pope, supra note 28, at 280-83 (stating that Colorado, Washington, California, Vermont, and Washington, D.C. 
closely model Oregon’s statute).  
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 As for patient qualifications, all nine jurisdictions require the patient to be an adult with a 
terminal disease, which means the disease cannot be cured and the patient’s condition will not 
improve.32 The life expectancy for a terminally ill patient must be six months or less.33 This 
requirement serves to avoid wrongful deaths where a patient may actually have a chance of 
recovery. The patient must also be a resident of the state. Nearly all MAID legislation requires 
proof of residency by demonstrating factors such as possession of a state driver’s license, 
registration to vote in the state, or evidence that the patient owns or leases property in the state.34 
California and New Jersey include a filing of a tax return as evidence of residency as well.35 Proof 
of residency helps protect against “MAID tourism,” or patients who travel to one of the nine 
jurisdictions to utilize the MAID process because it is not legal in their home jurisdiction. To be 
qualified, a patient must also be “capable.” The statutes generally define “capable” to mean that 
the patient has the ability to understand the nature and consequences of the situation at hand and 
has the ability to make an informed decision.36 This provision will be emphasized and further 
analyzed in Section IV of the paper. 
ii. Voluntariness 
 The next safeguard, voluntariness, mainly addresses the patient’s ability to rescind his or 
her request as well as potential undue influence. Every statute includes a provision that allows a 
patient, at any time, to rescind the request for lethal medication.37 The statutes also require 
 
32 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 127.800 §1.01 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.190(1)(d) (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18 § 5285(a)(10) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-102(16) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-3 (2019). 
33 Id. 
34 Zachary Gureasko, The Expansion of the “Right to Die”: Physician-Assisted Suicide, Concepts of State Autonomy 
& The Proper Political Process for Legalization, 1 Belmont Health L.J. 59 (2017); See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-
48-102(14) (2016).  
35 CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 443.2 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-11 (2019) 
36 CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 443.1(e) (2015); 
37 OR. REV. STAT. 127.810 §3.07 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.100 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-
105 (2016); D.C. Code § 7-661.03(a)(6) (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5283 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-10 
(2019); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 418 § 2140.21 (2019). 
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attending physicians to offer the patient an opportunity to rescind after the patient makes the 
request for lethal medication.38 Physicians are required to verify that the patient is acting 
voluntarily and is not being unduly influenced.39 Voluntariness also speaks toward the health care 
provider’s ability to decline to participate in any part of the process for any moral, ethical or 
religious reason.40 The healthcare provider opt-out provisions will be discussed in further detail in 
Section IV. 
iii. Witnesses 
 Witness restrictions help to assure that the patient is acting voluntarily. When the patient 
signs and completes his or her written request for lethal medication, two witnesses must be present 
in order to attest that the patient is competent, acting voluntarily, and not being coerced or under 
undue influence.41 At least one witness may not be a relative of the patient, may not be entitled to 
any portion of the patient’s estate upon his or her death, and may not be “[a]n owner, operator, or 
employee of the health care facility where the qualified patient is receiving medical treatment or 
is a resident.”42 Most states also restrict the attending physician from acting as a witness.43 A 
number of states include a provision requiring an individual of a long-term care facility with 
qualifications specified by the Department of Human Services to serve as a witness only if the 
patient is a patient of the long-term care facility at the time of the written request.44  
iv. Request Procedures 
 
38 Id. 
39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-10 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. 127.805 §2.01 (2017); D.C. Code § 7-661.03(a)(1)(C) (2016). 
40 Id. 
41 OR. REV. STAT. 127.810 §2.02 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.030 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-
104 (2016); CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 443.3(b) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-5 (2019); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 418 § 
2140.21 (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5283 (2016). 
42 Id. 
43 CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 443.3(b) (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-104(2)(c) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN 
§70.245.030 (2016); D.C. Code § 7-661.02(b)(4) (2016); OR. REV. STAT. 127.810 §2.02 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
26:16-5 (c) (2019);  
44 OR. REV. STAT. 127.810 §2.02 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.030 (2016). 
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 As for the request procedures, both written and oral requests are mandated under the 
statutes.45 Most states require at least one oral request and one written request to his or her 
attending physician. The oral request must be reiterated to the physician fifteen days after the first 
oral request.46 It is at that time when an attending physician is typically required to offer the patient 
an opportunity to rescind.47 In New Jersey and Maine, at least 48 hours shall pass between the date 
the patient signed the written request and the date the attending physician writes a prescription 
under the statute.48 These waiting periods serve as safeguards and give patients an opportunity to 
consider all information provided by the attending or consulting physician, to notify next of kin, 
and to take time to solidify his or her decision. After reviewing the common provisions of MAID 
state statutes, one can see how carefully the process is drafted to ensure safety and preservation of 
human life as well as protection of the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, as laid out 
by the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg.49 
III. RECENT LEGAL CHALLENGES  
The historical legal challenges centered mainly around whether there is a fundamental right 
for competent people to seek physician assisted suicide. This narrow definition of the right was 
not recognized to be fundamental by the Supreme Court.50 The Court also dealt with the distinction 
between death caused by refusal of life sustaining nutrition versus death caused by medication 
administered by a physician and why the former is authorized but the latter is not. Since then, the 
nine MAID jurisdictions have succeeded in passing legislation that allows terminally ill patients 
 
45 Supra, at § 3.06 (2017).  
46 Gureasko, supra note 34, at 72 (Vermont’s “various waiting periods and methods of requesting the prescription, as 
well as the physician’s role in the process, bear a striking resemblance to the related statutes” in Oregon and 
Washington.). 
47 Supra. 
48 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-10 (2019); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 418 § 2140.13 (2019). 
49 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997). 
50 Id. 
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to die in dignity while prohibiting physician assisted suicide and euthanasia. Today, these 
jurisdictions face new issues in court.  
A. Legal Challenge to New Jersey’s Legislation 
Litigation ensued in New Jersey just a few months after Governor Murphy signed the Act 
to allow qualified terminally ill patients to self-administer aid-in-dying medication.51 Dr. Yosef 
Glassman alleged that the Act violated a fundamental right to defend life, First Amendment rights, 
as well as equal protection and due process, among other things.52 The litigation focused on the 
plaintiff’s argument that the Act violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by failing to 
promulgate rulemaking and therefore the plaintiff may suffer harm from the significant change in 
the law.53 The appellate court held that the lower court failed to properly balance the factors 
required for an injunction.54 
 Judge Arnold Natali, writing for the appellate court, stated that the “plaintiff failed to 
establish that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent irreparable harm and preserve the status 
quo.”55 There was no evidence that the plaintiff was burdened by a request to implement the 
provisions of the Act. Furthermore, Judge Natali pointed out the Act’s unambiguous language 
rendered participation by physicians entirely voluntary.56 The Act only requires that healthcare 
providers who, based on religious or other moral bases, opt not to treat patients under the Act shall 
transfer the patient’s medical records to another healthcare provider. The court declined to 
acknowledge that the transfer of medical records is a matter of constitutional import. Additionally, 
 
51 Joseph Glassman, M.D. v. Gurbir S. Grewal, New Jersey State Attorney General, No. AM-707-18T3, slip op. at X 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 23, 2019). 
52 Supra. 
53 Supra. 
54 Bruce D. Greenberg, The Appellate Division Elaborates on the Crowe v. DeGioia Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctive Relief NEW JERSEY APPELLATE LAW (August 28, 2019) http://appellatelaw-nj.com/the-appellate-division-
elaborates-on-the-crowe-v-degioia-standard-for-preliminary-injunctive-relief/. 
55 Supra, note 51. 
56 Supra, note 51. 
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the language of the Act is clear in that the legislature did not intend to await administrative 
rulemaking nor was rulemaking necessary.57 While this opinion is not yet officially reported, it is 
useful for states to determine what challenges may arise from MAID statutes by health care 
providers and what to include in MAID statutes in order to avoid litigation.  
B. Legal Challenge to Vermont’s Legislation 
 Vermont’s Patient Choice at End of Life Act (“Act 39”) was similarly challenged. In Vt. 
Alliance for Ethical Healthcare, Inc. v. Hoser, various religious health care providers and 
physicians argued for an injunction to enjoin the Chair of the Vermont Board of Medical Practice 
from initiating any disciplinary proceeds that may arise from a refusal to inform patients of the 
options under Act 39.58 The legal challenge focused on whether healthcare providers are required 
to counsel for assisted suicide in a manner that may be inconsistent with their religious beliefs.59 
More specifically, the question became whether the informed consent requirements create a 
conflict between the legal requirements of medical practice and the health care providers’ personal 
convictions which include an aversion to enable assisted suicide.60  
The court determined that because both the Vermont Attorney General and the plaintiffs 
agree that if a patient requests help from a healthcare provider under Act 39, a referral to a website 
is sufficient to satisfy the informed consent requirements.61 The plaintiffs did not insist that silence 
on their part was necessary in order for them to abide by their personal and religious convictions.62 
Because the risk of actual harm of disciplinary action was found to be highly remote due to the 
consensus that a website referral would sufficiently inform patients of their options, the court held 
 
57 Supra, note 51. 
58 274 F.Supp. 3d 227, 231 (D. Vt. 2017). 
59 Id. at 238. 
60 Id. at 234. 
61 Id. at 235. 
62 Id. 
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that the plaintiffs lacked standing.63 This case raises the question of what exactly are the minimum 
requirements for health care providers who opt out. 
C. Legal Challenge to California’s Legislation 
In 2018, a challenge to California’s End of Life Option Act also failed for lack of 
standing.64 One of the legal challenges in People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court, was whether 
plaintiff-physicians who belong to a professional organization that promotes medical ethical 
standards are harmed by the requirement to diagnose a patient with a terminal disease. The 
argument reasoned that in diagnosing a patient with a terminal disease, the plaintiff-physicians 
make that patient eligible to receive lethal medication which impacts their “professional 
obligations and duties to clients.”65  
The court was also faced with a challenge regarding conflicting provisions. California’s 
Act allows a health care provider to prohibit its employees from participating in MAID but there 
is no rule against prohibiting an employee from providing information or a referral.66 In other 
words, under the statute, a “health care provider” cannot be subject to discipline for providing 
information or a referral but it was not shown that “the Act provides a similar safe harbor for the 
employee of a health care provider (unless the employee is also a health care provider).”67 
In addressing the first claim, the court explained that when a physician diagnoses a patient 
with a terminal illness, that patient is not automatically eligible and must still satisfy a number of 
requirements in the statute.68 The health care provider who diagnoses the patient is not in any way 
responsible for the patient’s later use in MAID. The physicians must also comply with the 
 
63 Id. at 239. 
64 People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court, 240 Cal. Rptr. 3d 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).  
65 Id. at 264.  




American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics (“Code of Medical Ethics”) which 
establishes a duty on the physician to communicate an honest diagnosis. Compliance with the Code 
of Medical Ethics might make the physicians uncomfortable, knowing the patient may eventually 
be qualified under the MAID legislation, but this is not sufficient to confer standing.69  
As for the second challenge, the court explained that even if the Act allows health care 
providers to prohibit employees from participating in the MAID process but does not expressly 
allow employees to provide information on MAID and referrals to patients, the plaintiff-physicians 
did not allege that they even employ health care providers or that their employees wish to provide 
information and referrals against the wishes of the plaintiff-physicians.70 Therefore, the plaintiff-
physicians lacked standing. Although standing requirements were not satisfied here, a question 
remains as to what the minimum requirements are for health care providers who choose to prohibit 
MAID in their facilities and the employees of such facilities. 
MAID legislation and bans on assisted suicide initially faced due process and equal 
protection challenges. Today, MAID statutes are largely challenged on the basis of a physician’s 
moral or religious rights not to participate. Thus far, the challenged statutes have been carefully 
drafted to survive litigation. In order to prevent a risk of future legal challenges, there are particular 
provisions that require attention.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
The nine MAID statutes have been drafted to account for legitimate state interests, as well 
as the interests of all parties involved. Nevertheless, there are particular provisions that should be 
standard across all nine jurisdictions but have not been adopted by some. Life is the most cherished 
gift. Where legislatures regulate MAID, every detail in every safeguard should be taken into 
 
69 Id. at 264-65. 
70 Id. at 265-66.  
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account to prevent potential dangers or misuse and to protect such sacred lives. This section will 
analyze which portions of which statutes should be revised or modeled on other states. This section 
will also recommend the regulations that should be enacted in order to protect the vulnerable lives 
of the terminally ill, as well as physicians and other health care providers. There are particular 
provisions that should be prioritized to prevent litigation.  
A. Is a Patient with Depression “Capable”? 
 All nine jurisdictions establish a rule that requires the patient to be referred to a mental 
health care professional if appropriate.71 Some provisions are less detailed than others. New 
Jersey’s Act is vague in that it merely requires the attending physician to refer the patient to a 
mental health care professional if the attending or consulting physician opines that the patient may 
not be capable.72 If a referral occurs, the attending physician shall not write a prescription for 
medication unless the mental health care professional determines that the patient is capable.73 
“Capable” is defined as “having the capacity to make health care decisions and to communicate 
them to a health care provider including communication through persons familiar with the patient’s 
manner of communicating if those persons are available.”74  
 The more thorough provisions specifically address whether the patient may suffer from 
depression or a psychiatric or psychological disorder that may cause impaired judgment.75 It is 
important to account for depression and any psychiatric or psychological disorders because these 
conditions could cause mental instability or cause the patient to make rash decisions. Under New 
 
71 ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 418 § 2140.8 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-6(a)(5) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-1 
(2019); D.C. Code § 7-661.04 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. 127.825 §3.03 (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-108 (2016); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.060 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5283(a)(8) (2016); CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 
443.7 (2015). 
72 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-8 (2019). 
73 Supra.  
74 Supra. at § 26:16-3. 
75 H.R.S. § 327L-6 (2019); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 418 § 2140.2 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. 127.825 §3.03 (2017); D.C. 
Code § 7-661.04 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.060 (2016). 
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Jersey’s statute, depression is not specified as a qualification for capability, increasing the risk that 
a patient who suffers from depression may have an impaired ability to appreciate his or her 
decision. It is not uncommon for people to make irreversible decisions out of emotional depression 
when those decisions do not reflect their enduring convictions.76 States must protect patients who 
are at risk of acting involuntarily or impulsively in making these irreversible decisions to end the 
patient’s life.   
 Some have argued that mental disorders are not synonymous with incompetence.77 Even if 
that is true, to allow any form of depression to alter a patient’s decision to end their life when that 
decision may go against that patient’s long-standing beliefs would have permanent and unfixable 
consequences. It has been argued that regardless of whether a patient is diagnosed with depression, 
the focus should be only on whether the patient is competent.78 Competence is sometimes defined 
as the ability to understand, appreciate, reason, and to communicate a choice.79 A patient who is 
clinically depressed may likely lack the ability to appreciate the risks and benefits of MAID and 
any alternatives to MAID. Physicians should be required to account for the possibility of 
depression when determining whether the patient is capable or competent in order to guarantee 
that the patient appreciates his or her decision and to give the patient an opportunity for counseling.  
 The waiting periods established in MAID statutes can help provide the patient with more 
time to consider the irrevocable nature of his or her decision. However, these waiting periods, as 
well as the mandated offer of an opportunity to rescind by the physician, are not a guarantee that 
those who choose to proceed are not basing their decision off of feelings of depression or other 
 
76 Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 27, 1997), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1997/03/27/assisted-suicide-the-philosophers-brief/. 
77 Candace T. Player, Death with Dignity and Mental Disorder, 60 Ariz. L. Rev. 115 (2018). 
78 Id. at 134. 
79 Id. at 139. 
  16
psychiatric or psychological disorders. In the interests of the MAID patients, depression or other 
psychiatric or psychological disorders should be included in reference to the patient’s ability to 
make an informed decision.  
 These recommendations may only effect a very small portion of the population, 
considering all the other MAID requirements that patients have to satisfy. In 2016, twenty percent 
of MAID patients in Oregon did not even chose to take the prescribed lethal medication and died 
of other causes.80 In Washington only four percent of patients were referred for a psychiatric or 
psychological evaluation in 2018.81 Only twelve New Jersey residents utilized MAID in 2019.82 
Nevertheless, as mental health problems become more prevalent in the United States, and as the 
number of jurisdiction that allow MAID increases, the legislatures should protect patients seeking 
MAID who might be effected by depression or other psychiatric or psychological disorders. 
It is also possible that a patient with a terminal illness could suffer from depression due to 
the reality of his or her situation. Even if that is the case, it is in the state’s interest to protect 
patients from allowing their condition to lead to suicidal thoughts. MAID statutes are meant to 
provide a dignified death for the terminally ill. At a minimum, a diagnosis of depression or a 
psychological impairment should force physicians to pause the MAID process and further examine 
whether the patient is fully competent and capable, with second or third opinions from 
psychologists or psychiatrists.  
B. Healthcare Provider Opt-Out Provisions and Facility Prohibitions 
 
80 Id. at 154 (citing OR. Health Auth. Pub. Health Div., Oregon Death with Dignity Act Data Summary 2016 (2017) 
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/Providerparnerresouces/evaluationresearch/deathwithdignityact/documents/yeye19.
pdf).  
81 Katherine Hutchinson, PhD, MSPH, et al., 2018 Death with Dignity Act Report, Washington State Department of 
Health (July 2019) https://www.deathwithdignity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2018-Report-WA-Death-with-
Dignity-Act.pdf.  
82 Supra, at note 4. 
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 Every statute includes a provision that generally allows healthcare providers to refuse to 
participate in the process. There is no duty on a healthcare provider to participate or to carry out 
the patient’s request.83 Washington State’s Death With Dignity Act speaks in the affirmative, 
mandating that “[o]nly willing health care providers shall participate in the provision to a qualified 
patient of medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.”84 California’s 
statute also grants immunity to physicians who refuse to inform a patient of his or her right and 
decline to refer a patient to a physician who participates in MAID.85  
Furthermore, some statutes give entire healthcare facilities the ability to opt out.86 Health 
care providers may prohibit other health care providers from participating in MAID when on the 
premises of the prohibiting health care provider.87 Some jurisdictions expand on that and allow 
prohibiting health care providers to issue sanctions or some sort of discipline if the prohibiting 
health care provider has given notice to the sanctioned health care provider.88 New Jersey does not 
have a provision that expressly allows a health care provider to prohibit the participation in MAID 
on the premises of that facility. New Jersey simply relieves a health care provider from liability if 
the healthcare provider refuses to participate.89 
As evinced by the recent legal challenges to state statutes, these provisions are critical. Not 
only are the opt-out provisions significant for the basic reason that no health care provider should 
 
83 OR. REV. STAT. 127.885 §4.01 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.010, 70.245.190 (2016); D.C. Code § 7-
661.10 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5284 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-117 (2016); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 
418 § 2140.21 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-17 (2019); CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 443.14(b) (2015); 
84 WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.190(1)(d) (2016). 
85 CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 443.14(e)(2) (2015); 
86 Id.; D.C. Code § 7-661.10(c) (2016); 
87 OR. REV. STAT. 127.885 §4.01(5) (2017); D.C. Code § 7-661.10(c) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN 
§70.245.190(2)(b)(i) (2016); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 418 § 2140.22 (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5286 (2016); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-118(1) (2016). 
88 ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 418 § 2140.22 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §70.245.190(2) (2016); D.C. Code § 7-
661.10(d) (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5286 (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-118(2) (2016). 
89 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-17 (2019). 
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be obligated to participate in MAID, these provisions help avoid litigation. As contentious as 
physician aid-in-dying is in the United States, no person or entity should be required to disregard 
moral, ethical, religious or other beliefs. In general, every statute accounts for the basic right to 
opt-out. 
Equally important is a provision allowing entire healthcare facilities to prohibit physicians 
acting under the prohibiting provider’s control from participating in MAID. Where a facility is 
owned and operated by a health care provider who has pronounced moral, ethical, or religious 
beliefs, that health care provider should be able to limit the use of MAID in its facility so long as 
notice is given. Legislation like New Jersey’s, that does not expressly give health care facilities 
the right to prohibit MAID, is more likely to face litigation by religious facilities that do not support 
MAID.  
Facility prohibitions are not likely to hinder a patient’s ability to seek the opportunity of 
MAID because a health care provider is generally required to transfer the patient’s relevant medical 
records to another healthcare provider under most statutes.90 Vermont’s Patient Choice and Control 
at the End of Life Act (“Vermont’s Act”) does not require a physician to transfer medical records 
in the event that the physician elects not to participate in the provision of a lethal dose of 
medication to the patient.91 Vermont’s Act does not offer any details in regard to what an unwilling 
physician is required to do, which makes it susceptible to litigation similar to the Hoser case.92 In 
order to improve the process, statutes should allow a health care provider to opt-out, but require 
that health care provider to provide the patient with at least some information on MAID and to 
transfer the patient’s relevant medical records to a willing health care provider. So long as a health 
 
90 ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 418 § 2140.21 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-17(c) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-113 
(2016); CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 443.14(e)(3) (2015); 
91 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5285-86 (2016). 
92 Id. 
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care provider who opts out of the MAID process is required to transfer medical records, a patient 
is nevertheless likely to receive treatment elsewhere. 
A problem does arise in the circumstance where a patient’s condition is so severe that it 
hinders his or her ability to physically change institutions. In this case, the patient’s right to utilize 
MAID under the statute is diminished. Where a health care provider refuses to participate in 
MAID, an exception may be required for these patients. Perhaps a willing physician from an 
outside facility should be brought in to treat the patient. This counter argument addresses a 
complicated worst-case scenario that requires a more thoughtful resolution or a compromise 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
In sum, at the very least, MAID legislation should not hold physicians liable who decline 
to participate in the process. In order to avoid legal challenges, every jurisdiction should also allow 
health care facilities to prohibit physicians from practicing MAID. In the interests of the patient, 
MAID statutes should require a health care provider who opts out to transfer the patient’s medical 
records to another health care provider.  
C. Refusal to Inform and Refer 
In addition to the opt-out provisions for health care providers and the prohibitions by health 
care facilities, MAID legislation should address the refusal to inform a patient or refer the patient 
to another physician. As the Vermont litigation proves, it is not entirely clear the point at which a 
health care provider may draw the line when opting not to treat a terminally ill patient with respect 
to MAID. In the most extreme cases, a health care provider may vehemently disagree with any 
form of MAID and refuse to even refer a patient to another source or to provide a patient with 
information on MAID, as discussed above. California’s Act addresses this by protecting healthcare 
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providers who refuse to inform a patient of his or her right to MAID and refuse to give the patient 
a referral.93  
Although it could be argued that California’s provision granting immunity to healthcare 
providers who refuse to inform a patient or refer a patient to a different healthcare provider is 
necessary to protect the interests of the healthcare providers who disagree with MAID, 
§443.14(e)(2) of California’s Act goes too far. Allowing a physician to diagnose a patient with a 
terminal illness and thereafter excuse himself or herself from treating or even communicating with 
the patient thereafter will leave the patient in the dark, confused and abandoned. The patient 
should, at a minimum, be entitled to a referral. The physician should provide the patient with 
further information, such as a website on MAID, as agreed on in Hoser.94 
The First Amendment rights and interests of healthcare providers who have moral, ethical, 
or religious beliefs that do not allow them to participate in any way in the MAID process are not 
violated. The assertion that the healthcare providers, such as the plaintiffs in Becerra and Hoser, 
face redressable injury under the MAID statutes that require them to refer a patient against their 
beliefs lacks merit. In the event that a patient later seeks to utilize the MAID process, the physician 
who opted out but who was required to provide the patient with a referral or other information, is 
not responsible in any way for the patient’s choice to self-administer lethal medication. That 
patient still has to satisfy the other requirements and procedures in the MAID statute. To say 
otherwise is far too attenuated.  
MAID statutes should not include immunity for health care providers who are unwilling to 
merely inform a terminally ill patient of a website or some other resource where that patient can 
research a potential MAID opportunity. California’s §44.314(e)(2) does not give terminally ill 
 
93 CAL. CODE REGS. 1.85 § 443.14(e)(2) (2015). 
94 Hoser, at 232. 
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patients the information they are entitled to in these circumstances. Because these extreme 
circumstances of refusal are rather rare, it may not even be strictly necessary to amend existing 
MAID legislation but it could very well invite a legal challenge. If §443.14(e)(2) of California’s 
statute is not amended, or if future jurisdictions adopt similar provisions, courts may end up having 
to balance a patient’s interest in receiving information on MAID from the diagnosing physician or 
a health care provider’s First Amendment interests. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The various safeguards in MAID legislation may seem onerous or difficult for a terminally 
ill patient to satisfy but they serve a necessary purpose of preserving life and protecting the 
integrity of the medical profession. There are currently a few particular provisions that require 
attention. The MAID statutes should account for whether a patient suffers from depression in order 
to guarantee that the patient’s decision is not impaired. All health care providers should be granted 
the opportunity to opt-out of participating in MAID and facilities should be entitled to prohibit 
participation. Last, unwilling health care providers should, at a minimum, provide the patient with 
a source of information on MAID and transfer the patient’s medical records to a willing health 
care provider. Legislatures should consider the recent legal challenges when carefully drafting 
future MAID statutes and account for these recommendations in order to better protect the interests 
of all parties involved.  
